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THE SOUL AND THE BRAIN BETWEEN ANATOMY
AND NATURPHILOSOPHIE IN THE EARLY
NINETEENTH CENTURY
by
MICHAEL HAGNER *
In the years around 1800 two hypotheses led to fundamental discussions in German
neuroanatomy and philosophy. The first was developed by Samuel Thomas
Soemmerring (1755-1830) inhis treatise Uberdas Organ derSeele(On the organ ofthe
soul) of 1796, in which he postulated that the organ of the soul was located in the
fluid of the cerebral ventricles.' The second was published only two years later by
Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) in a short and schematic paper, in which he developed
a research programme based on the assumption that several independent organs
or faculties of mind were located in the cerebral cortex.2 This was his doctrine
of organology, later known as phrenology, although Gall himself never used this
term.
In comparing the two, their differences are usually stressed more than their
similarities. It has often been argued that Soemmerring's attempt was a late revival of
the medieval cell doctrine, an opinion that,'as I will show, is based on a profound
misunderstanding ofSoemmerring's intentions.3 Looking at the historical approaches
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to Soemmerring more generally, one gains the impression that his concept of a
circumscribed organ of the soul was the onlyfauxpas in an admirable scientific life,
during which he enjoyed a good reputation as an anatomist.4 Franz Joseph Gall, on
the other hand, has often been considered as the forerunner ofthe localization theory
of modern brain research, even if his organology was regarded as pseudo-science.5
While Soemmerring has been thought ofas the end ofa tradition, Gall is seen as the
beginning ofa new one, although it has been at the same time pointed out "that the
doctrine of the seat ofthe soul is linked with the doctrine ofcerebral localization".6
This argument is usually based on the general assumption that brain research in the
early nineteenth century took the form of a rivalry between localization theory and
brain equipotentiality, according to which all functions are performed by the whole
brain without any localization.7 True, Soemmerring's concept of a localized and
circumscribed organ of the soul had in general no lasting influence on the further
development ofbrain research, although from the point ofview oflocalization theory
it was preserved in Gall's theory. However, for several decades Gall was vigorously
discussed by anatomists, physiologists, and philosophers, until the experimental
"refutation" of his work by Pierre Flourens (1794-1864) led to his overthrow. Only
from the 1860s onward was his contribution remembered by the pioneers ofmodern
localization theory. While recognizing the heuristic value of this distinction between
Soemmerring and Gall, I will attempt to follow another strategy in order to
understand the development of brain research at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. In analysing the contemporary reception of Soemmerring and Gall, I will
show that the discussion about localizing the organ of the soul and different mental
propensities and talents took place on two different levels-of philosophy and of
anatomical methodology. This separation may seem trivial, but a more careful look
will reveal that both levels are "part of the story of how human beings have
attempted ... to apply the categories ofscientific understanding to themselves: minds
and brains caught somehow between a universe of social and moral realities, and a
universe that seems to stand outside of such realities, and that they choose to call
physiologische Vorstellungen im 19. Jahrhundert. Ein Uberblick', Phil. Nat., 1987, 24: 3-14, p. 4; Claudio
Pogliano, 'Between form and function: a new science of man', in Pietro Corsi (ed.), The mill ofthought:
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4 Besidestheauthorsmentioned in note 3above, seeHelmkeSchierhorn, 'SamuelThomasSoemmerring
(1755-1830) als Neuroanatom', Z. mikrosk. -anat. Forsch., 1980, 94: 1051-76. A more discriminating view
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Umfeld S. Th. Soemmerrings, Soemmerring-Forschungen 3, ed. Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont,
Stuttgart and New York, Gustav Fischer, 1988.
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neuroscientifc concepts, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987, pp. 241-4.
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'natural' .8 Ifwe separatephilosophy and anatomicalmethodology, wecan showthat
bothviewpointswerepart ofacomplexdisputeabouttheknowledgeofhumannature.
I will argue that Soemmerring and Gall did not agree on the first, but concurred
perfectly on the second, with which I will begin.
There is no doubt that both men undertook their research within an anatomical
framework. SoemmerringandGallmadefar-reachingclaimsconcerningthebrainand
thesoul with theaid ofanatomical arguments. Theirbasicassumption wasthepositive
correlation between structure and function, which means that given functions were
implied in given brain structures, and this led to given animal or human behaviour.
More specifically, the aspect ofquantity, that is the size ofa defined part ofthe brain,
was the anatomical explanation for differing behaviour.9
Theywere thereforecriticizedbyanatomists, whoarguedagainstsuch aleadingrole
for anatomy. The methodological question was whether or not anatomy was
competent to deal with problems of localization offunction and ofthe relationships
between brain and soul. The dispute was inaugurated mainly by Karl Asmund
Rudolphi (1771-1832), and, to a lesser extent, by Johann Friedrich Meckel (1781-
1833).10 Working as professors in Berlin and Halle, both were leading protagonists in
anatomy and physiology in the first decades ofthe nineteenth century and both saw
themselves as strict advocates ofempirical science. In our context, it is interesting to
examinethe application ofthisempirical beliefto brain research, and we shall see that
it is not useful to reduce the dispute about the brain and the soul to a strict separation
between empirical evidence and hypotheses in anatomical research. This reveals an
important conceptual difference between the two Prussian anatomists: Rudolphi was
much more radical in his criticism and finally abandoned brain research, because his
methodological scepticism was linked to a completely different context, within which
he was interested in the human soul and behaviour. Meckel, on the otherhand, shared
methodologicalprincipleswith Rudolphi,butcame toconclusionsthatallowedhim to
preserve some of Gall's assumptions.
At this point the other, philosophical level ofdiscussion becomes relevant, namely,
whether or not the nature of the human soul is knowable in a physical or only in a
metaphysical context. In the late eighteenth century neither Descartes' strict dualism
nor La Mettrie's mechanical materialism were accepted as giving satisfactory answers
to the questions concerning the presence of the soul in the brain.
WernerKraussdistinguished betweentwomain trendsthatwereconstitutiveforthe
discussions on human nature at that time. An "emancipatory" current understood
8 Anne Harrington, 'Beyond phrenology: localization theory in themodernera', inCorsi, op. cit., note 3
above, pp. 206-14, on p. 206. Harrington focuses on the discussion from the mid-century onward, but the
same is true for the earlier period.
9 Thisproblem was analysed by William F. Bynum, 'The anatomical method, natural theology, and the
functions of the brain', Isis, 1973, 64: 445-68; idem, 'Varieties ofCartesian experience in early nineteenth
century neurophysiology', in S. F. Spicker and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (eds), Philosophicaldimensions
ofthe neuro-medical sciences, Dordrecht and Boston, Reidel, 1976, pp. 15-33.
10 Useful studies on Rudolphi's life and works are Johannes Muller, 'Gedachtnisrede aufCarl Asmund
Rudolphi', in Abhandlungen der Koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Aus dem Jahre 1835, Berlin
1837, pp. xviii-xxxviii; Mauritz Dittrich, 'Die Bedeutung von Karl Asmund Rudolphi (1771-1832) fur die
Entwicklung der Medizin und Naturwissenschaften in Berlin im 19. Jahrhundert', Wiss. Z. Univ.
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man as a product within the chain of being. Although this view accepted man's
privileged position as the most developed and most noble being, the soul was
nevertheless regarded as a variety of life. A more "theological" current, on the
contrary, upheld the beliefin divine creation and the immortality and indivisibility of
the soul, which served to preserve the unity and the freedom of the self." 1 It would be
too simple to argue, however, that these two positions solely represented the
often-cited querelle des anciens et des modernes. Rather, they expressed a dilemma,
which became manifest in the approaches of some protagonists of Enlightenment
philosophy. One example is Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who pleaded for
those two positions at the same time.12 In his most influential book Ideen zur
Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit (1784-91) he referred to the beginnings of
mankind, and in comparing men and apes described the orangutan in an
anthropomorphic manner. His passions and vices, Herder continued, made him
similar toman, and his thinkingpower ("Denkungskraft") came close to reason.13 This
comparison was only appropriate, because Herder accepted the relationship between
anatomical andmorphological development on the one hand, and the advancement of
abilities on the other; the souls of men and of orangutans had their particular places
within the chain of being. Thus far Herder was a protagonist of what Krauss
characterized as the emancipatory current, but at the same time he insisted upon the
indivisibility of the soul and pointed out that reason, memory, imagination, and
passions were the various expressions of the indivisible soul.'4 This account had
important consequences for the discussion of the soul and the brain. While Herder
regarded it as useful to examine the size of the brain in different species, he also
demanded a physiological examination of the more "beautiful organization and
proportion [of the brain], which enabled it to receive the mental sentiments and
ideas".15 One might be inclined to assume that Herder was a Cartesian dualist. Not at
all. Herder wanted to have it both ways, that is, to explain some aspects of human
nature on the basis of brain research and to hold the metaphysical view of man's
indivisible soul at the same time. Herder himself seemed to have no difficulties in
harmonizing these two approaches. For his successors this was an enormous stimulus,
but it also evoked tricky difficulties. This is clear from the different approaches of
Soemmerring and Gall, who both referred to Herder in their own ways. Gall simply
took the idea ofthe morphological development ofthe brain and related it to mental
talents and properties by separating the mind from the soul-body problem, which for
Greifswald, math.-naturwiss. Reihe, 1967, 16: 249-77. On Meckel's biography see Rudolf Beneke, Johann
Friedrich Meckel der Jungere, Halle, Niemeyer, 1934.
1 Cf. Werner Krauss, Zur Anthropologie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Die Fruhgeschichte der Menschheit im
Blickpunkt der Aujlkarung, Ulistein Materialien 35248, Frankfurt a. M. and Berlin, Ulistein, 1987, p. II.
12 On Herder's philosophy and anthropology see H. B. Nisbet, Herder and thephilosophy andhistory of
science, Cambridge, Modern Humanities Research Association, 1970; Manfred Wenzel, 'Die
AnthropologieJohann Gottfried Herders und das klassische Humanitatsideal', in Gunter Mann and Franz
Dumont (eds), Die Natur des Menschen: Probleme der Physischen Anthropologie und Rassenkunde
(1750-1850), Soemmerring-Forschungen 6, Stuttgart and New York, Gustav Fischer, 1990, pp. 137-67.
13 Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, in Werke, ed. Heinrich
Kurz, Leipzig, Bibliographisches Institut, 1884, vol. 3, pp. 93-4.
14 Ibid., p. 99-100.
15 Ibid., p. 98.
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him was beyond an empirical approach. Soemmerring, however, tried to fulfil
Herder's ambiguous claim by explaining the presence ofthe soul in the brain on the
basis of new anatomical and physiological insights. Soemmerring was therefore
attacked for his metaphysical claims, and he was refuted for using the wrong method
in this issue, while Gall was criticized for having excluded metaphysics. This position
was formulated by two anatomists and physiologists, who were the main protagonists
of romantische Naturphilosophie: Karl Friedrich Burdach (1776-1847) and Carl
Gustav Carus (1789-1869).16 It would be too simple to propose their basic opposition
to Rudolphi and Meckel on the one hand and to Soemmerring and Gall on the other.
There were important differences in Burdach's and Carus's approaches. This suggests
that they represented different interests despite their common philosophical attitude.
SOEMMERRING AND GALL
Although Soemmerring was aware that the question of localizing the site of
interaction between soul and body was an old problem, he was convinced that he had
found a completely new solution. The novel element was that he did not search for the
organ of the soul in the solid matter of the brain, but in the fluid of the cerebral
ventricles. To support his hypothesis he developed a theory of the function of the
organ of the soul, by which he attempted to explain the process of nerve-signal
transmission in the cerebrospinal fluid and the interaction between the fluid and the
cranial nerves. Therefore, Soemmerring divided his argument into two: an anatomical
part and a theoretical, his "transcendental physiology".
Soemmerring's basic anatomical assumption followed Descartes' claim that the
meeting site of the afferent and efferent nerve signals was the place of interaction
between body and soul. The next problem for Soemmerring was to identify the origins
ofall cranial nerves in the walls ofthe ventricles. Before this, however, he had to deal
with anatomical questions: whether the ventricles were in fact cavities and whether
they were filled with fluid. These problems had been widely discussed in the late
eighteenth century. Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777) in 1762 had argued that the
ventricle walls touched in living animals and that they were filled with fluid only after
death.17 Soemmerring rejected both propositions by referring to his own anatomical
observations. However, he did not take into account the difference, which was crucial
to Haller, between the dead and living animal, thus revealing that he did not base his
arguments on vivisection.18 Instead, Soemmerring saw Haller's error as a result of
comparing the hollow spaces of the cerebral ventricles with those elsewhere in the
body, such as the cardiac and the pleural cavities. This assumption, he argued, had led
Haller to a wrong conclusion, namely that the function ofthe cerebrospinal fluid was
16 For Burdach's life see his autobiography: Karl Friedrich Burdach, Ruickblick auf mein Leben:
Selbstbiographie, Leipzig, Leopold Voss, 1848; on Carus see Wolfgang Genschorek, Carl Gustav Carus.
Arzt, Kiinstler, Naturforscher, 2nd ed., Leipzig, Hirzel, 1980.
17 Albrecht von Haller, Elementa physiologicae corporis humani, vol. 4, Cerebrum, Nervi, Musculi,
Lausanne, Bousquet, 1762, pp. 39-43.
18 Soemmerring was harshly criticized in an anonymous review of his book for this negligence: 'Ueber
Sommerrings Entdeckungen das Organ der Seele betreffend', Journal der Erfindungen, Theorien und
Widerspruche in der Natur und Arzneiwissenschaft, 1796, 5 (18): 3-55, on p. 30.
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only to prevent the walls sticking together.19 Soemrnerring therefore suggested that a
"correct" anatomical statement (that is, one not comparing the cerebral ventricles
with othercavities ofthe body, because oftheir different shape and structure) leads to
a "correct" physiological conclusion (that is, the fluid had a function in addition to
keeping the ventricles expanded). A remarkable aspect ofSoemmerring's logic is that
five years earlier he had been convinced about the anatomical facts, but drew no
conclusion concerning the function ofthe cerebrospinal fluid.20 This suggests that his
interpretation of its function was not the result of anatomical evidence, but the
product of his ideas about the organ of the soul.
Soemmerring also followed this strategy in his analysis of the topographical
anatomy ofthe cranial nerves. His discussion oftheir origins in the brain shows that
he could find them in the walls ofthe ventricles in only a few cases, whereas in others
he could find no connections between the nerves and the ventricles. Therefore he
pointed out the difficulties ofdissecting, which did not allow him to find what he was
looking for.2' Nevertheless he was convinced that all cranial nerves had a direct
connection with the cerebrospinal fluid. For the moment he was satisfied to have
found four cranial nerves to support his hypothesis.22 One ofthese was the olfactory
nerve, for he could show a direct connection between the olfactory bulb and the
lateral ventricles in mammals and in human embryos, but not in human adults. He
explained this difference in the following way:
Does not natural history teach us that some animals are far more directed by the
olfactory sense than humans? The reason is that in these animals the large cavity of
the olfactory nerve accepts a large amount of the cerebrospinal fluid, and thus
represents a large part of their sensorium.23
This conclusion led Soemmerring to his main anatomical argument, namely the
correlation between material quantity and function. He stressed this point on several
occasions, arguing that the size ofthe ventricles and the quantity ofthe fluid were the
material basis forthe innate differences inthedevelopment ofmental talents.24 He did
not hesitate to bring in comparative anatomy. "I know ofno animal, which possesses
such large and well-formed cerebral ventricles as man."25 This statement presents a
further variation in Soemmerring's efforts to prove that man's superiority over
animals had a material basis. After it was clear that the absolute size ofthe brain was
not a valuable parameter, because the elephant and the whale had a larger brain than
man, he suggested defining theweight and size ofthe brain in relation to theweight of
the cranial nerves.26 Hence the search for the organ ofthe soul was dependent upon
19 Soemmerring, op. cit., note I above, pp. 10-12.
20 Idem, Vom Baue desmenschlichenKorpers, Frankfurt, Varrentrapp & Wenner, 5 vols, 1791-96, vol. 5,
pt. 1, 1791, pp. 48-9, 87.
21 Idem, op. cit., note I above, pp. 17-18.
22 Ibid., p. 30.
23 Ibid., p. 23.
24 Ibid., p. 51. 25 Ibid., p. 52.
26 For details see Paul Julius M6bius, Franz Joseph Gall, in Ausgewahlte Werke, 7 vols, Leipzig, Johann
Ambrosius Barth, 1903-05, vol. 7, pp. 59-63; Bynum, 'Varieties', op. cit., note 9 above, p. 29.
6The soul and the brain
the claim to demonstrate man's singularity without reconsidering Descartes'
immaterial soul. Man's singularity, however, also implicated the European's
superiority over the non-European for Soemmerring. This will be discussed below;
but first of all the second part of Soemmerring's argument has to be analysed.
This second, and theoretical, argument concerned the interaction between the
cerebrospinal fluid and the cranial nerves. The main problem was to explain the
transmission ofthe nerve signals in fluid, and he found the solution by proposing an
animation and organization for it. As this was beyond empirical evidence he
introduced the dimension of "transcendental physiology",27 which he tried to
establish alongside his anatomical approach. The animation of matter and the
organization of living bodies was widely discussed at that time, and, in particular,
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) had
laid the ground for what was defined as "vital materialism".28 Linked to
Blumenbach's principle ofthe Bildungstrieb (formative drive), Kant had argued that
one could understand the function ofthe individual parts ofthe organized body only
in relation to the whole body. Therefore, the union of these parts into a whole could
only happen through mutual causation, which was going beyond the domain of
mechanistic thinking. At this point Kant introduced teleology, the idea that the
interaction ofseparate parts could only be interpreted as a purposeful process.29 The
problem in our context is that Soemmerring used terms like animation and
organization of the body without giving credit to the theoretical background. His
argument was that animation ofthe cerebrospinal fluid was a necessary condition for
the phenomenon oflife, because "the beginning oflife (Urleben) or the beginning ofa
movement is not even thinkable in a being which is constant and unchangeable in its
form".30 He employed this postulate to explain the interaction between the common
sensorium and the ventricular fluid, and argued that the former needed the latter for
its function because of its special character. Thus Soemmerring concluded that the
physiological process within the organ of the soul should also have a singular
character, different from the physiological processes in the brain and nerves. It was
necessary, then, to propose a qualitative change of the signal on its way from the
cranial nerve to the organ of the soul, and vice versa. Therefore, the ventricular fluid
was the "medium uniens"..31 One might be inclined to link Soemmerring's notion of
the ventricular fluid to the older concept of "animal spirits" secreted in the brain and
conveyed by the nerves, but this would obscure his aims. Animal spirits had served for
the transmission ofsensations to the organ ofthe soul and to transmit messages from
the latter to the different parts of the body. Soemmerring, like most contemporary
anatomists and physiologists, was involved in the debate on animal electricity and the
27 Soemmerring, op. cit., note I above, p. 37.
28 Cf. Timothy Lenoir, 'Kant, Blumenbach, and vital materialism in German biology', Isis, 1980, 71:
77-108.
29 Immanuel Kant: Kritik der Urteilskraft, (§ 65). in Werke, 4th ed., 10 vols, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel,
Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975, vol. 8, pp. 483-8. For details see Lenoir, op. cit.,
note 23 above; idem, The strategy of life: teleology and mechanics in nineteenth-century German biology,
2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 24-30.
30 Soemmerring, op. cit., note I above, p. 41.
31 Ibid., pp. 58-60.
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nature of nerve function.32 His concept of the animation and the organization of
ventricular fluids served to uphold the unity and the singularity of the soul by
imposing "vital materialism" on brain research. The reverse of the coin, however, is
that this reinforced an older idea of Soemmerring, which demonstrates his
predilection for a "'quantification" of human nature. In 1784 Soemmerring had
published his treatise Uber die korperliche Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europaer.
On the basis of the dissection of three black corpses, Soemmerring not only pointed
out the physical differences between black and white man, as the title had suggested;
he also proclaimed that Blacks had smaller cerebral ventricles and a smaller brain33
and concluded that this might explain their "wildness, unruliness, and their minor
ability to develop a higher culture".34 Soemmerring concluded from his results that
within the Chain of Being Blacks were closer to apes than Whites.35 It would go
beyond the scope of this paper to delve further into the late eighteenth-century
anthropological discussion, but it can be argued that it was one context in which
Soemmerring could use comparative anatomy, the comparison of human races, and
brain anatomy and physiology in order to find a reasonable explanation for human
nature and a definition for the historical standpoint of European man.
"Transcendental physiology", then, could provide a philosophical support of his
aims, and it moreover promised to solve the body-soul problem.
Soemmerring had a high reputation as an anatomist, but now his ambition was to
reach out to not only anatomists, physiologists, or physicians, but the whole
intellectual community in Germany. The reaction was enormous, but it was a
complete disaster for him. Among his critics were Johann Wolfgang Goethe
(1749-1832), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), Georg Christoph Lichtenberg
(1742-1799), and Blumenbach. Nobody disputed the anatomical findings, but all
rejected Soemmerring's claim to link brain anatomy with metaphysics.36 The most
distinguished criticism was delivered by Kant, who wrote the epilogue to the treatise
of 1796, a rare example in the history of ideas where an hypothesis and its most
profound criticism were published in the same book.37 Soemmerring had hoped that
by asking Kant to write an epilogue, Kant's authority would encourage the
32 Cf. Werner Friedrich Kiimmel, 'Alexander von Humboldt und Soemmerring: das galvanische
Phdnomen und das Problem des Lebendigen', in Gunter Mann and Franz Dumont (eds), Samuel Thomas
Soemmerring und die Gelehrten der Goethezeit, Soemmerring-Forschungen 1, Stuttgart and New York,
Gustav Fischer, 1985, pp. 73-87.
33 Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, Oberdiekorperliche Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europjer, Mainz,
1784, pp. 16-20. To be precise, he reported that Blacks had larger cranial nerves. In conformity with his
earlier rule, however, by which brain size was defined relative to that of cranial nerves, Soemmerring
concluded that Blacks had smaller brains.
34 Ibid., p. 24.
35 Forafull accountofSoemmerring'santhropology cf. Georg Lilienthal, 'Samuel Thomas Soemmerring
und seine Vorstellungen uber Rassenunterschiede', in Mann and Dumont, op. cit., note 12 above, pp.
31-55.
36 Goethe, for example, wrote in a letter (28 August 1796) that Soemmerring should have omitted the
second part of the treatise dealing with transcendental physiology, and that it would have been better to
leave out the soul, too. Cf. Goethe und Soemmerring. Briefwechsel 1784-1828, ed. Manfred Wenzel,
Soemmerring-Forschungen 5, Stuttgart and New York, Gustav Fischer, 1988, pp. 106-7.
37 For ananalysis ofKant'sepilogue see Riese, op. cit., note 3 above, pp. 315-17; Riese and Hoff, op. cit.,
note 6 above, pp. 59-61; Peter McLaughlin, 'Soemmerring und Kant: Uber das Organ der Seele und den
Streit der Fakultaten', in Mann and Dumont, op. cit., note 32 above, pp. 191-201.
8The soul and the brain
acceptance of his philosophical approach. His proud and grateful announcement of
the epilogue, however, stands in peculiar contrast to Kant's text.
Kant suspected that Soemmerring had not differentiated sharply between the "seat
ofthe soul" and the "seat ofthe organ ofthe soul", and asked who was competent to
deal with this fundamental question. He noted a "battle of the [academic] faculties",
between the medical (anatomical and physiological) on the one hand, and the
philosophical on the other.38 The former, he continued, based its results on empirical
reasoning, the latter demanded a priori explanations. Kant pointed out that a person
taking the philosophical view in characterizing the mind or the soul could not
possibly accept the anatomical and physiological concept ofthe seat ofthe soul, and
vice versa. His epistemological argument was that the soul is exclusively "the object of
the inner sense, and hence only determinable from temporal conditions".39 Searching
for a topographical site for the soul would imply perceiving it by the same sense, that
perceived the outer world.
The soul can only perceive itselfthrough the inner sense; the body, however, can only
be perceived (internally or externally) through the external senses. Hence the soul can
not determine a location for itself, because in order to be able to do so it would have
to make itselfan object ofits external Anschauung and to make itselfexternal to itself,
which is self-contradictory.40
Kant suggested a strict division of the problem: the soul itself was subject only to
philosophical analysis, while physiology had the task ofexamining the function ofthe
brain, or of the common sensorium, which was that part ofthe brain responsible for
the unification of sensory perceptions. This meant, on the other hand, that Kant in
principle rejected a science dealing with the soul and body at the same time.
In his second argument, Kant discussed Soemmerring's grounds for postulating the
animation and organization ofthe cerebrospinal fluid. He refused to define a fluid as
being organized, because a fluid has the property of being
a stable matter, ofwhich each part can be moved out ofits place through the smallest
force, within the place, within which it is contained. This property seems to be
contradictory to the concept of an organized matter, which one considers as a
machine, hence as a material which is resistant to the shifting of its parts (and also to
the alteration of its inner configuration) with a particular force.4'
For this reason, Kant argued that the fluid was not a candidate for the organ of the
soul, given that Soemmerring insisted on the concept of organization in the sense of
38 Soemmerring, op. cit., note I above, pp. 81-2. In this context Kant's notion of the "battle of the
faculties" does not have the political implications that it had for his book with the same title, published two
years later: Der Streit der Fakultdten, K6nigsberg, Nicolovius, 1798.
39 Soemmerring, op. cit., note I above, p. 82.
40 Ibid., p. 86: "Nun kann die Seele sich nurdurch den inneren Sinn, den Korper aber (es sey inwendig oder
auBerlich) nur durch auBere Sinne wahrnehmen, mithin sich selbst keinen Ort bestimmen, weil sie sich zu
diesem Behuf zum Gegenstand ihrer auBeren Anschauung machen und sich auBer sich selbst versetzen
mifBte; welches sich widerspricht."
41 Ibid., p. 84: "Fliissig ist eine stetige Materie, deren jeder Theil innerhalb dem Raum, den diese
einnimmt, durch die kleinste Kraft aus ihrer Stelle bewegt werden kann. Diese Eigenschaft scheint aber
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"vital materialism". He tried to solve this dilemma by proposing a dynamic
organization of the ventricular fluid. Thus the process of signal transmission in the
fluid was not mechanical-as Soemmerring had assumed-but chemical.42 With this
modification Kant brought Soemmerring's hypothesis into agreement with his own
definition of the organization of matter, although his attempt was not accepted by
contemporary physiologists. This was because "vital materialism" was an important
factor in the development ofembryology and in physiology, but not in brain research,
as will be seen below.
In the same context Kant also rejected "transcendental physiology". According to
him, the transcendental method serves to uncover the constitutive elements of any
experience. This process, however, is necessarily metaphysical, or, in Kant's words,
"43 Transzendentalphilosophie is "the system of all principles of pure reason".
Consequently, a physiological theory-despite its speculative character-cannot
possibly be part of the transcendental method. Instead he argued that the notion of
animation and organization was part of a scientific concept. As in his earlier
corrective, Kant insisted on a strict separation ofthe scientific and the metaphysical
approaches.44
Kant's criticism was highly relevant for further discussion. Even ifhis position was
not accepted, his precise analysis of Soemmerring's physiology and his
epistemological argumentation of separating the soul and the organ of the soul
created the framework for subsequent discussion. It is questionable whether Kant
could have anticipated the consequences of his considerations. After all, he had not
challenged the legitimacy of the concept of the organ of the soul. But he wanted to
restrict it to the material site of the unification of perceptions and thus make it the
subject of physiological research. With Kant's rejection of any philosophical
relevance ofthe search for the organ ofthe soul bymeans ofanatomy and physiology,
the demise of this concept was in sight, and it survived only briefly, until it was
replaced by two completely different concepts. The complete failure of
Soemmerring's claim had consequences for the subsequent development ofanatomy
and physiology: either they avoided radically any philosophical viewpoint and
competence; or they claimed to be philosophical in themselves. Both positions were
upheld in early nineteenth-century Germany.
Franz Joseph Gall's fame began to spread long before he published an extensive
study on his subject in 1810, in part with Johann Caspar Spurzheim (1776-1832).
From 1800 onwards anatomists began to visit Gall in Vienna, and enthusiastic
reports were published by his followers. After he and Spurzheim made a
demonstration tour through Europe from 1805 to 1807, there was hardly an
dem Begriffeiner organisirten Materie zu widersprechen, welche man sich als Maschine, mithin als starre,
dem Verrucken ihrer Theile (mithin auch der Anderung ihrer inneren Configuration) mit einer gewissen
Kraft widerstehende Materie denkt."
42 Ibid., pp. 84-5.
43 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Werke, op. cit., note 29 above, vol. 3, p. 64.
44 On this point cf. McLaughlin, op. cit., note 37 above, pp. 198-200.
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anatomist, or even an intellectual, who was not familiar with Gall's basic
assumptions.45
The analysis ofGall and his adversaries has focused mainly on his rejection by the
Academy of Sciences in Paris under the leadership of Georges Cuvier (1769-1832)
and its direct consequence, Pierre Flourens' experimental "refutation". Several
historians have argued plausibly that the metaphysical basis for this attack lay in
Cartesian dualism, by which the indivisibility of the soul was upheld.46 Flourens
refused to accept the existence within the brain of several small brains representing
different talents and propensities of the soul. His experiments led him to the
conclusion that sensation, volition, and so forth were not localized in different parts
ofthe cerebral cortex. For Flourens, this was direct prooffor the unity ofthe self. The
significant feature of Flourens' disputation is that he construed a link between a
philosophical assumption and experimentation. According to him, brain localization
was incompatible with the independent soul and free will, whereas equipotentiality
harmonized perfectly with it. This conclusion could be possible only if anatomy or
physiology were able directly or indirectly to support the Cartesian concept of the
indivisible and independent soul.47
Even if Flourens was the most illustrious, he was neither the only nor the first of
Gall's critics. Between 1802 and 1808, there were more than fifty publications on his
doctrine, many in agreement, but many more or less critical.48 As Gall at that time
had not yet published his first systematic work, the criticism was based mainly upon
his lectures, his anatomical demonstrations on his tour through Germany, and the
short schematic paper of 1798,49 in which he developed his research programme, and
which was not superseded until the publication of his last work in 1825. Although
Gall's theory has been studied intensively by various historians,50 I should like to
point out some crucial arguments in the 1798 paper.
Gall's first postulate was that mental talents and propensities are innate and that
they have their seat and cause in the brain. The nobility and the complexity of these
functions increase in proportion to the increasing size ofthe brain relative to the mass
ofthe body and in particular to the nerves.51 Gall's second point was that abilities are
different from propensities, and that both are divided into several sub-groups. Thus,
45 Cf. Erich Ebstein, 'Franz Joseph Gall im Kampf um seine Lehre auf Grund unbekannter Briefe an
Bertuch usw. sowie im Urteile seiner Zeitgenossen', in Charles Singer and Henry E. Sigerist (eds), Essays on
the history ofmedicine: presented to Karl Sudhoffon the occasion ofhis seventieth birthday November 26th
1923, London and Zurich, Oxford University Press and Seldwyla, 1924, pp. 269-322; Gunter Mann, 'Franz
Joseph Galls kranioskopische Reise durch Europa (1805-1807): Fundierung und Rechtfertigung neuer
Wissenschaft', Nachrichtenbl. dt. Ges. Gesch. Med., Naturwiss. Tech., 1985, 34: 86-114.
46 On the metaphysical and cultural background of Flourens' criticism see Clarke and Jacyna, op. cit.,
note 7 above, pp. 267-85.
47 The agreements between Gall and Flourens were pointed out by Bynum, 'Varieties', op. cit., note 9
above, pp. 27-30.
48 On Gall's scientific reception in Germany see Martin Blankenburg, 'Seelengespenster. Zur deutschen
Rezeption von Physiognomik und Phrenologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Versuch einer historischen
Sondierung', in Mann and Dumont, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 211-37, on pp. 215-20.
49 See note 2 above.
50 Besides the authors mentioned in note 5 above see Robert M. Young, Mind, brain andadaptation in the
nineteenth century: cerebral localization and its biological contextfrom Gall to Ferrier, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1970, pp. 9-53.
51 Cited from Lesky, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 50.
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he maintained, they had their seats in different and independent parts ofthe brain. If
this conclusion was correct, Gall argued, different forms of the brain evolved in
different species; and the same was also true for individuals within one species.52
Because ofthe variable development ofthe individual organs in the brain in different
individuals, their behaviour became comprehensible. Gall's last and most popular
postulate was that the inner surface ofthe cranium is determined by the outer surface
ofthe brain. Consequently talents and propensities could be deduced from the outer
surface ofthe skull, ifthis was equivalent to the inner one. Gall's aim was to trace a
causal link between the structure ofthe brain, its function, and human behaviour. In
his paper of 1798 Gall emphasized neither the structure nor the function ofthe brain,
but rather he postulated that function was the linking element between structure and
behaviour. In 1809 he pointed out that it was natural "to consider structure and
function together and to treat them as a single and identical doctrine".53
Gall derived his research strategy from the empirical tradition of the first Vienna
School.54 As a disciple of Maximilian Stoll (1742-1787), who had upheld the
doctrines and methods of Boerhaave and van Swieten, Gall rejected pure reasoning
and insisted upon observation. This leads to the problem of Gall's methodological
approach to discovering the seats of the different organs. In this connection Gall
referred mainly to anatomical and pathological observations ofthe brain as well as to
the examination of skulls. He demanded a study of the correlation of brain lesions
and clinical symptoms. Furthermore, he suggested that one should examine the
specific parts of the brain by referring to the known talents and propensities of the
individual, and to undertake studies in comparative anatomy.55 None of these
demands was unusual around 1800, but the point is that Gall put his hypotheses into
an anatomical framework from the beginning. His strategy was not primarily
anatomical, but he needed anatomy to help answer his questions. Consequently Gall
was greatly interested in persuading anatomists; Rudolphi, reporting on his meeting
with him in Vienna, stated that he wished to be criticized by means of anatomical
arguments.
He [Gall] told me himselfthat ifI would not be won over by his theory I should write
against him, but then I should argue as an anatomist and not fight only with
philosophical weapons.56
Gall's challenge to his contemporaries was that he regarded anatomy as competent to
investigate problems of human nature. The consequence was that some anatomists
confronted Gall with the question of how far he was able to fulfil his anatomical
programme.
52 Ibid., p. 53.
53 FranzJosephGallandJohannCasparSpurzheim, UntersuchungeniiberdieAnatomiedesNervensystems
uberhaupt, und des Gehirns insbesondere. Ein demfranzoisischen Institut uberreichtes Memoire, Paris and
Strassburg, Treuttel & Wurtz, 1809, p. 421.
54 Lesky, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 155.
5 Ibid., pp. 55-6.
56 Karl Asmund Rudolphi, Bemerkungen aus dem Gebiet der Naturgeschichte, Medicin und
Thierarzneykunde, aufeiner Reise durch einen Theil von Deutschland, Holland undFrankreich gesammelt, 2
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Another aspect of Gall's anatomical approach leads to the question of its
relationship to Naturphilosophie in Germany. Gall was perfectly aware of the
provocative character of his doctrine. As early as 1798 he anticipated reproach for
challenging the immortality ofthe soul, rejecting it with the remark that he was only
interested in the "laws of the material world. ... He [the natural scientist] cannot
decide about the life of the mind. He only observes, and teaches that in this life the
mind is linked to the body".57 It was obvious to Gall that the assumption ofseveral
independent talents and propensities did not at all deny the eternity and the
indivisibility ofthe soul.58 Later on, he stated more explicitly that the soul was not the
object of science:
I even omit the question ofthe soul, although we have to think about a principle ofits
actions (Prinzip der Tatigkeit). As anatomists and physiologists, however, we are
unable to say anything about it.59
Here, Gall seems to agree with Kant's separation of the philosophical and the
physiological method. But, on the other hand, Gall did not point out clearly what he
understood by a philosophical problem relevant to the knowledge of human nature.
This is not surprising: for him, such a problem did not exist. In the preface to his last
publication, Sur les fonctions du cerveau et sur celles de chacune de ses parties
(1821-25), he made the ambition of his project quite clear.
The aim ofall myinvestigations is to establish adoctrine ofthe functions ofthe brain.
This doctrine must lead to a complete understanding of human nature.60
If this was Gall's aim, his admission that he had not investigated the human soul
becomes meaningless. He discarded metaphysical problems of the soul as irrelevant
and thus proclaimed an absoluteness, which brought him into conflict with the
philosophical and theological approach-a reminder of Kant's diagnosis of a battle
of the faculties. In contrast to the discussion in France, which was based on the
Cartesian tradition, the debate in Germany was more complex. Gall was confronted
by two groups with different interests, although each focused on his anatomy and
physiology of human nature. Gall was regarded in part as a pseudo-scientist or
charlatan, but he was mainly criticized by established scientists because of his
radicalism in terms of the accepted confines of anatomy and philosophy.
Soemmerring tried to combine anatomy with transcendental physiology, while Gall
strongly rejected every kind of transcendentalism and insisted on observation. Both
vols, Berlin, Realschulbuchhandlung, 1804-5, vol. 2, p. 151. Fifteen years later Gall repeated similar
statements in a letter (15 August 1820) to the anatomist Justus Christian Loder (1753-1832). See Ebstein,
op. cit., note 35 above, p. 315.
57 Cited from Lesky, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 51.
18 Ibid., p. 52.
59 Gall to Andreas and Nannette Streicher, 19 October 1824. In Neuburger, op. cit., note 5 above, p. 35.
60 CitedfromLesky, op.cit., note2above, p. 73. Although I argue thatGall was amaterialist, Iagreewith
Rieseand Hoffthatcerebral localization is notnecessarily connected tomaterialism, because the former "is
notconcerned with theproblem ofthe nature ofthis mutual relationship". Cf. Riese and Hoff, op. cit., note
6 above, p. 62.
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agreed in their claims to explain human nature, namely the differences between men
and animals, and the variations ofmen one from another. On this point Gall's theory
was more diversified because he introduced the categories oftalents and propensities.
Soemmerring sustained the philosophical importance of localization, while Gall
ignored this claim. But much more importantly, both agreed with the anatomical
method, and both pointed out explicitly the correlation between material size and the
development of the psyche. Quantity was essential for both of them, and anatomy
was their central method.
RUDOLPHI AND MECKEL
We have seen that Kant distinguished between a philosophical approach on the one
hand and an anatomical one on the other. It has also been shown that Soemmerring
and Gall gave concrete answers to the question ofthe soul and the brain. In Rudolphi
and Meckel we have two anatomists who were much more reserved concerning these
problems. Although they did not regard anatomy as unable in principle to deal with
brain localization, theyjudged it incompetent at that time. At the same time, they did
not relate their anatomical approach to Haller's concept ofequipotentiality of brain
function. It was.not the case that around 1800 there was a debate between believers in
Haller's concept and Gall's localization theory: the discussion had shifted to a
philosophical and methodological level at which Soemmerring and Gall were cited,
but not Haller. Consequently Haller played no role in Rudolphi's and Meckel's
arguments. Nevertheless, theirconcepts were in no way identical, Rudolphi was much
more involved in the controversy, and his contribution had a more constructive
character.
Central to Rudolphi's criticism of Soemmerring was his conception of the use of
hypotheses in science. Haller's pragmatic argument had been that hypotheses are
useful in so far as they might lead to theoretical questions that could be answered by
observation orexperiment. Consequently, hypotheses were necessary in order to pose
questions and were an important element ofempirical science.61 Rudolphi, however,
accepted hypotheses only in those cases where he failed to make any useful
observation. His warning against uncritically mingling hypothesis and empiricism
was primarily directed against the new concepts ofNaturphilosophie and in particular
the attempts to understand the relationship of the soul and the brain. According to
Rudolphi doubt, not hypothesis or theory, should be the first step in science.62
Remarkably, Rudolphi did not refer to Haller's authority. Instead he took a position
very close to that of the French Ideologues.63 The influence of this "sceptical
61 Albrecht von Haller, 'Vorrede zum 1. Theile derallgemeinen Historie der Natur', inSammiung kleiner
Hallerischer Schriften, 2nd ed., 3 vols, Bern, Emmanuel Haller, 1772, vol. 1, pp. 47-77.
62 KarlAsmund Rudolphi,BeytragezurAnthropologieundaligemeinenNaturgeschichte, Berlin, Haude&
Spener, 1812, pp. 41-2.
63 On the Ideologues seeOwsei Temkin, 'Thephilosophical background ofMagendie'sphysiology', Bull.
Hist. Med., 1946, 20: 10-35; George Rosen, 'The philosophy of ideology and the emergence of modern
medicine in France', ibid., 328-39; Erwin H. Ackerknecht, 'Elisha Bartlett and the Philosophy of the Paris
Clinical School', Bull. Hist. Med., 1950, 24: 43-60.
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empiricism" was much stronger in France than in Germany.64 Nevertheless, it was a
motive for Rudolphi's dispute with Soemmerring.65
Rudolphi seems to have been the only anatomist who compared Soemmerring's
observations ofthe cranial nerves with his own. He analysed each cranial nerve and
did not in principle reject Soemmerring's findings, but he gave them a different
interpretation. According to Rudolphi, the fact that notall thecranial nervescould be
found in the walls of the ventricles detracted from Soemmerring's original
hypothesis.66 In the case of the olfactory nerve, for example, he rejected
Soemmerring's postulate ofa direct correlation between the size ofthe olfactory bulb
and the sense of smell: if Soemmerring had found this anatomical structure only in
human embryos, this was meaningless for function, because the function of smell in
embryos was unknown.67 Rudolphi's argument was thus based on, first, a denial of
the connection between structure and function, because there was as yet insufficient
experimental knowledge; and second, a rejection of the optimistic "soon-to-be"
strategy. He interpreted Soemmerring's and his own anatomical observations in a
way which testified against a localization of the organ of the soul.
Rudolphi, of course, did not reduce the problem to the anatomy of the cranial
nerves. In his discussion of Soemmerring's "transcendental physiology", he amply
pointed out his scepticism. Thus he accepted the animation and organization of
matter only as heuristic epithets for unknown bodily processes. For him, an
acceptable definition of animation was the observable activity of those parts of the
body which were able to cause an effect on themselves or on other parts ofthe body.
But this applied to solid matter such as nerves, muscles or internal organs, and not to
fluids.68 This concept seems to come close to Kant's definition of organization, but
the striking difference is that Rudolphi ignored the idea of purpose, because-
according to him-it was an hypothesis without an empirical basis. The conclusion
which Rudolphi had to draw was clear: while Kant and Blumenbach had sought a
theoretical concept to explain the phenomenon oflife, Rudolphi merely admitted his
ignorance.
The consequence for brain function and the organ of the soul was that Rudolphi
separated these two problems. He did not regard the function of the brain as
undetectable in principle. However, he maintained that the contemporary
methodology was insufficient, because it lacked an adequate anatomical and
physiological basis. Forexample, heagreed with thecommon theoretical definition of
the organ ofthe soul as that place in which all efferent and afferent nerves met, and
whose destruction would evoke a complete loss ofsensory and motor function. As no
one had found such a circumscribed part of the brain, he suggested that the whole
6But the influence also existed in Germany. Cf. Erna Lesky, 'Cabanis und die GewiBheit in der
Heilkunde', Gesnerus, 1954, 11: 152-82.
65 For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between Rudolphi and Soemmerring see Michael
Hagner, 'Soemmerring, Rudolphi und die Anatomie des Seelenorgans: "Empirischer Skeptizismus" um
1800', Medizinhist. J., 1990, 25: 211-33.
66 Karl Asmund Rudolphi, Anatomisch-physiologische Abhandlungen, Berlin, Realschulbuchhandlung,
1802, p. 181.
6 Ibid., p. 175.
68 Ibid., p. 163.
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brain be regarded as the organ of the soul.69 All further speculations about the
function ofthe brain unsubstantiated by observation and experiment were ofno use
to Rudolphi. Moreover, he vigorously excluded from anatomy and physiology
questions concerning the soul and the nature of psycho-physical interaction. He
would accept neither a dualistic nor a materialistic point ofview as reasonable bases
for anatomical research.
Ifone assumes the existence ofa spiritual soul, is the assumption ofa connection with
an individual part of the body clearer than the assumption of a connection with a
compound part? Is not the nature of a link between the soul and the body always
obscure? And, on the other hand, what darkness shrouds us ifwe accept only material
evidence.70
Rudolphi's charge against Soemmerring, that he should have excluded questions
concerning the soul, does not differ from Kant's in its consequences. There is,
however, one obvious difference: Kant's was the expression of an epistemological
argument, Rudolphi's the result ofa sceptical interpretation ofanatomical facts. I do
not suggest, however, that this position, which came close to that of the French
Ideologues, provided Rudolphi's only motivation. He had, of course, read Kant's
epilogue, and the fact that he did not use it in his argument with Soemmerring does
not exclude Kant's influence. The question is, in what respects had Kant created the
general theoretical framework for an anatomist like Rudolphi, who then went on to
discuss the soul and the brain in his own field. As described above, Kant had argued
for a strict separation of an empirical basis for brain research, and a metaphysical
viewpoint dealing with the soul. After this separation it was much easier for an
anatomist to exclude the soul from anatomy. This meant, of course, a reduction of
anatomical competence, but it seems to have liberated men like Rudolphi and others
to delve further into what they understood by empirical research. As Rudolphi did
not hold a materialistic viewpoint-and here he differed from the Ideologues-Kant's
metaphysical treatment of the soul was acceptable for him. In other words: the
attraction ofKant's argument for Rudolphi was that it allowed him to excludecentral
questions on human nature from the anatomical discourse, but then to discuss them
on a completely different level. This becomes clear in Rudolphi's treatment of
organology.
In contrast to his controversy with Soemmerring, Rudolphi would have agreed in
principle with Gall's methodological view. Both of them were good empiricists and
Gall, for example, would like Rudolphi have polemicized against Soemmerring's
transcendental physiology. The controversial question, however, was, in how far it
was allowable to link man's moral and physical natures. Rudolphi perfectly realized
the connection between Gall's anatomy and psychology and argued against the
localization of different mental talents and propensities with the remark that there
was no valuable criterion for an exact definition ofqualities such as pride or vanity.
The reason for this, he argued, was that human behaviour was a dynamic system
69 Ibid., p. 187.
70 Ibid., p. 189.
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changing during one's lifetime. Rudolphi further pointed out that our impression of
human character is not necessarily identical with the character itself, because our
judgement always depends on our own interests, sympathies, and antipathies.7' He
did not therefore reject the localization of brain function in general, but merely
pointed out that it is a contradiction to establish a direct link between dynamic
behaviour and a static localization in the brain, particularly since the underlying
assumption-our daily experience-is anything but reliable.72 But even if it were
possible to define a particular talent, this signified nothing about its representation in
the brain. Provocatively, Rudolphi demanded a comparison of such a talent with a
localized part ofthe brain in more than one case. Only then would it be legitimate to
propose a correlation. It was clear to him that no one had ever been able to provide
this, and therefore: "The brain has taught us nothing".73
In Gall's theory, the innate character ofmental talents and propensities was linked
to the increase in size of the separate organs in the brain. Rudolphi argued that the
power of an organ depended not only on its size or weight, but also on its inner
energy, which was independent from these.74 In this way, the rejection of a
compatibility between structure and function meant a separation between physiology
and anatomy; and the size and weight ofthe brain were not linked to behaviour.75 In
this context the brain's own physiological processes were used against Gall, although
Rudolphi had earlier argued against Soemmerring that the nature of brain activity
was unknown. Against both Soemmerring and Gall, Rudolphi vehemently criticized
the postulation of a link between the size of the brain and human talents. It is
therefore unlikely that Rudolphi's scepticism was based on purely methodological
reasons alone. Another motive becomes more obvious in his attempt to make relative
the innate character ofmental abilities. Although he did notdefinitely exclude factors
such as the form and energy of the brain, the ability to learn was much more
important to him. The development ofmental talents, he noted, mainly depended on
the education ofthe child; and ifsome talents were more developed than others, this
was because of the quality of education, not the innate size of any organs in the
brain.76 Herewith Rudolphi brought a new dimension into the discussion. If it was
Gall's aim to explain all of human nature with his system, Rudolphi suggested that
this problem be discussed on a different level.
In 1800 or 1801 Rudolphi had visited not only Gall in Vienna, but also Johann
Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827)77 and his school in Burgdorf, Switzerland.
Rudolphi's portrait ofthis visit is not only a beautiful description oflife in Burgdorf,
71 Rudolphi, op. cit., note 56 above, p. 164.
72 In this context Rudolphi mentioned Gall's autobiographical confession that he had known a boy with
protuberant eyes and an excellent memory, which led him to assume a correspondence between linguistic
talent and a facial feature. Rudolphi added that he had met several peoplewith such eyes and a rather poor
memory. See ibid., p. 166.
73 Ibid., p. 164.
74Ibid., p. 158.
75 Rudolphi was even cautious in comparing the brains ofquadrupeds and men in relation to form and
function. See ibid., pp. 158-9.
76Ibid., p. 155.
77 On Pestalozzi see Michael Heafford, Pestaloz-i: his thought anditsrelevance today, London, Barnes &
Noble, 1967. A useful overview with extensive quotations is presented by Theodor Ballauff and Klaus
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it also shows his enthusiasm for the positive influence of education.78 Most
fascinating for Rudolphi was that Pestalozzi's system was concerned not only with
the intellectual aspect of learning, but also with the moral development and the
training of the child's practical abilities: only the harmony of all three aspects
guaranteed the Bildung des Menschlichen. He continued:
He [Pestalozzi] brings up boys to be human beings-the baron, future scholar or
artist are not educated here; rather it is the human being who is educated. The
potentialities (Anlagen) of man are developed in a general way; his strengths are
drawn out from himself.79
This is an exact depiction of Pestalozzi's approach, which recognized that the
task of teaching was to develop man's mind, body and heart.80
It would be too simple to argue that Rudolphi rejected Gall because he believed in
man's development into an autonomous person, an active participant in an
enlightened society.81 Of course, it is no coincidence that Rudolphi came to regard
Gall's doctrine as a modification of Johann Caspar Lavater's (1741-1801)
physiognomy,82 the only difference being that Gall characterized man on the basis of
cranial bumps, not facial expressions. Rudolphi agreed with Georg Christoph
Lichtenberg83 that man's character was to be described only on the basis of
behaviour.84 But Gall had not denied the influence ofeducation. Confronted with the
existence of a significant bump without the correlating talent, and vice versa, Gall
conceded that natural potentialities could be suppressed during a given lifetime and,
conversely, that any ability could result from good education without innate talent. In
this modification, however, Rudolphi saw the devaluation of the entire theory:
Ifthere are more or less developed parts or organs ofthe brain which are responsible
for our personalities, our likes or dislikes, and our intellectual powers, then I cannot
imagine that a given talent would be completely silent if its corresponding great
material potentiality (groJie An/age) were present.85
Rudolphi concluded that agrofie Anlage did not exist in such a specific way and that
it was not represented in any part of the brain. He did not accuse Gall of being an
Schaller, Padagogik: eine Geschichte der Bildung und Erziehung, 3 vols, Freiburg and Munich, Karl Alber,
1969-73, vol. 2, Vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, 1970. pp. 480-9.
78 Rudolphi, op. cit., note 56 above, pp. 137-46.
19 Ibid., p. 145.
80 Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Fragment uber die Grundlagen der Bildung, 1803. Cited from Ballaufand
Schaller, op. cit., note 77 above, p. 480.
81 Rudolphi alsopublished avolume ofpoetry, inwhich hepraised theidealsofEnlightenment: Gedichte,
Berlin and Greifswald, Reimer, 1798.
82 Lavater'smostinfluentialworkwasPhysiognomiseheFragmentezurBeforderungderMenschenkenntnis
und Menschenliebe, 4 vols, Leipzig and Winterthur, Weidmanns Erben & Reich and Heinrich Steiner,
1775-78.
83 Lichtenberg (1742-1799) had written a furious attack against Lavater: Ober Physiognomik vwider die
Physiognomen zur Be.forderung der Menschenliebe und Menschenkenntnis, Gottingen, Dieterich, 1778.
84 Rudolphi, op. cit., note 56 above, p. 183.
85 Ibid., p. 165-6.
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anti-Enlightenment fatalist, but he saw the danger of fatalistic consequences if
everything in human nature were reduced to brain weight and to the specific form of
some ofits parts. Gall was persuaded that the effect ofeducation was solely based on
the knowledge ofthe organization ofthe brain;86 Rudolphi, on the contrary, thought
that education was based on the beliefin a self-aware and independent personality.87
In comparison with Rudolphi, the question of the organ of the soul and the
localization of brain function is by no means as central to the work of Meckel. Its
importance, however, lies in the definition ofthe role ofanatomy. Although Meckel
did not consider methodological questions, he agreed with Rudolphi's theses
concerning the possibilities and the limits of anatomy. His conclusion, however,
consisted ofa cautious plea for the localization ofbrain function. Meckel had studied
with Johann Christian Reil (1759-1813), Blumenbach, and Cuvier before he was
appointed professor of anatomy in Halle in 1808.88 His scientific programme is
revealed in his editorship ofthe Archivfur die Physiologie, which Reil had founded in
1796.89 After Reil's death in 1813 Meckel continued thejournal as Deutsches Archiv
fur die Physiologie.90 In a short preface he pointed out that thejournal was open only
to reports of observation and experiment. It seems obvious against whom this
statement was directed: from about 1805 onward Reil had made thejournal available
to papers dealing with animal magnetism.91 Meckel was rather critical of this
controversial theory, and he made this quite plain in his preface. He rejected
speculation, but disagreed also "with those who make claims for observation and
experiment, although unable to complete even one experiment correctly. Their only
purpose is to obtain one correct result in hundreds'.92 Meckel did not specify the
rules for correct empiricism, so his strategy has to be deduced from his approach to
brain anatomy. The first volume of his journal (1815) opened with a long article by
Meckel on the development of the central nervous system ofmammals, from which
questions concerning brain localization and the organ ofthe soul were excluded.93 In
86 Cf. Temkin, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 286-8; and Pogliano, op. cit., note 3 above, p. 153.
87 Rudolphi's persisting interest in pedagogy coincides with his call to the Berlin University in 1810
through the agency ofWilhelm von Humboldt. In an unpublished letter to Humboldt, Rudolphi pointed
out that he was in full agreement with the so-called Bildungsprogramm; and he was quickly engaged in its
practical realization. He made suggestions for the Promotionsordnung, and, more importantly, was a
member of the commission drawing up the statutes for the University together with Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861), and August Boeckh (1785-1867). 1
am preparing a more detailed study on Rudolphi's role in the building of the University and the
Anatomical Institute in particular.
88 TherehasbeennogeneralstudyonMeckel'scontribution toanatomyandphysiology. Someaspectsare
treated in Beneke, op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 63-117; and Lenoir, 1989, op. cit., note 29 above, pp. 56-61.
89 Archivffur diePhysiologif, 1795-1811, vols 1-11. From 1807 Johann Heinrich Ferdinand Autenrieth
(1772-1835) was Reil's co-editor; he also edited a final volume (12) in 1815.
90 Deutsches Archivfuir die Physiologie, 1815-25, vols 1-11. In 1826 Meckel renamed it the Archivfuir
Anatomie und Physiologie, 1826-32, vols 1-7.
91 Reil himself did not, however, publish on animal magnetism: his attitude to it is analysed by Heinz
Schott, 'Zum Begriffdes Seelenorgans bei Johann Christian Reil (1759-1813)', in Mann and Dumont, op.
cit., note 4 above, pp. 183-210.
92 Deutsches Archivfur die Physiologie, 1815, 1: iv.
93 Johann Friedrich Meckel, 'Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte derCentraltheile desNervensystems
in den Siiugethieren', ibid., pp. 1-108.
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his Handbuch dermenschlichen Anatomie (1815-20),94 only localization plays a rather
significant role.
Concerning the organ of the soul, Meckel rejected Soemmerring's concept of the
ventricles. He gave only a topographical account ofthe ventricles without any hint of
the fluid's special character or function.95 Still more importantly, Meckel challenged
the idea that the organ ofthe soul must be identical with the meeting-place ofafferent
and efferent nerves. Rudolphi had doubted the existence ofsuch a common site, but
Meckel had no firm opinion. On the one hand he left undecided with which substance
the central ends ofthe cranial nerves were connected, and whether or not they were
connected among themselves.96 At the same time, he pointed out that some sensory
and motor nerves not only had a common origin, their function was in part mixed,
that is, they had both motor and sensory functions.97 On this basis Meckel regarded
them as a unity, and he argued against Gall's opinion that systems for voluntary
movement and sensory perception were represented in different parts of the brain.
This leads to Meckel'sjudgement ofGall's localization theory. First ofall he regarded
Gall as a serious brain anatomist and often cited him in an approving way along with
Alexander Monro secundus (1733-1817), Soemmerring, and Reil in his chapters on
the nervous system. But Meckel was completely silent concerning Gall's organology,
with the exception of the question of localization. Meckel's strategy in the face of
difficult hypotheses was to cite arguments for and against them; the localization of
mental functions was such an enigma. According to him, the problem ofwhether the
whole brain oronly circumscribed parts are the "seat ofthe origin(Urquell) ofmental
and bodily life"98 could be decided only by observation and experiment. Hence he
summed up the arguments for brain equipotentiality:
1. Even an extensive lesion ofthe brain does not necessarily lead to mental defects.
2. A lesion in one particular part ofthe brain does not necessarily lead to the loss
of the same mental function in different individuals.
3. An increase in mental power is not necessarily correlated with an increase in the
brain's size and weight.99
On the other hand, Meckel referred to the arguments for localization:
1. The complexity of mental activities seems to be related to the compound
structure of the brain.
2. The greater development ofparticular mental propensities seems to parallel the
development of particular parts of the brain.100
In discussing these contradictory opinions, Meckel refuted the first two arguments
for equipotentiality. First, he noted, lesions ofthe same part ofthe brain were never
identical in different individuals; and second, the brain's symmetrical doubleness
94 Idem, Handbuch der menschlichen Anatomie, 4 vols, Halle and Berlin, Buchhandlung des Hallischen
Waisenhauses, 1815-20.
95 Ibid., vol. 3, 1819, pp. 520-35.
96 Ibid., vol. 1, 1815, pp. 288-9. Meckel-in agreement with Gall speculated that it wasthegreymatter,
but he did not insist upon this.
97Ibid., p. 315.
98 Ibid., p. 327.
99 Ibid.
00Ibid.
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could neutralize lesions on one side. Moreover, he argued, one area ofthe brain could
even compensate for the loss ofan area on the other side which did not correspond to
it. This was also confirmed for him by the uniformity of the brain's microscopical
structure (textura).101 On the basis of these considerations alone, Meckel concluded
that "different abilities ofthe soul (Seelenkrafte) correspond to different organs in the
brain".102 This conclusion, however, does not characterize Meckel as a follower of
Gall. Rather, Meckel combined several elements of the previous discussion. First of
all, he argued on the basis ofpathological findings. This had been an aspect ofGall's
programme, but Meckel was not at all interested in explaining human nature and
carefully avoided any statement about the correlation ofthe brain and human talents.
With reference to embryology and comparative anatomy, Meckel specified the
powers of the soul and localized the more primitive ones in the lower parts of the
brain, and the nobler ones in the higher parts.'03 The point, however, is that Meckel
did not use the criterion ofinnate quantity to explain the differences between humans,
and thus the idea of individuality was not doubted.
Rudolphi had studied the brain in order to examine the limits of anatomical and
physiological research, and the investigation of the soul within an anatomical
framework was, for him, beyond such limits. The consequence-and Rudolphi was
aware of this-was that he accepted only the investigation of observable bodily
processes. Meckel essentially agreed with him on this methodological point. But while
Rudolphi rejected localization theory because of its psychological import, Meckel
gave credit to the idea on a far more unpretentious level. This should not seduce us
into making Meckel one ofthe founders ofmodern brain localization. His approach
was far too superficial for a valuable research strategy, and the theoretical
background was quite different from that of the 1850s.1° Nevertheless, Meckel's
concurrence with Rudolphi in excluding questions concerning the soul from
anatomical discourse shows that an important current in early nineteenth-century
anatomy was willing to give up its competence in one important aspect of human
nature. I argued above that Kant created the basis for this self-restriction. Moreover,
Meckel could show that even Gall's idea of localization harmonized with a
post-Kantian understanding of cerebral anatomy. Thus he reached a synthesis that
agreed with nearly everyone.
BURDACH AND CARUS
The enormous influence of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling's (1775-1854)
writings on romantische Naturphilosophie and physiology is beyond doubt,'05 and the
101 Ibid., p. 328. By textura Meckel meant the smallest elementsofthe nerve system, theKugelchen, which
were discovered by Giovanni Maria della Torre (1713-1782). 102 Ibid., p. 328.
103 Ibid.
104Concerning thecomplex problems oflocalization in the mid-nineteenth century see Anne Harrington,
Medicine, mind, and the double brain: a study in nineteenth-century thoughit, Princeton University Press,
1984.
105 Lenoir(op.cit.,note29above),hasdoubtedSchelling'sinfluence onphysiology. Lenoirfocusedmainly
on developmental physiology, however, and a look at sensory physiology and brain physiology in general
leads to a more balanced view. Lenoir's view has been criticized with someplausible arguments by Kenneth
L. Caneva, 'Teleology with regrets', Ann. Sci., 1990, 47: 291-300.
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same must be true ofhis impact upon brain research during the Romantic period. His
assumptions that were most influential in medical and physiological thinking, were
(1) the philosophy of identity or totality, (2) the principle of polarity, and (3) the
concept of advancement in nature.106 In particular, the idea of identity between
microcosm and macrocosm, between mind and nature, brought a new element to the
discussion. Schelling's equation, "nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the
indivisible Nature",107 had a significance for brain research beyond that of Burdach
and Carcus.'08 Schelling made it quite plain that the problem of soul and body was
outside the domain of empirical anatomy and physiology. He argued against the
dualistic theories, which shifted the problem from one part of the brain to the other
without providing any valuable solution:
But sometime, somewhere, a point must surely come where mind and matter are one,
or where the great leap we have so long sought to avoid becomes inevitable; and in
this all theories are alike.
Whether I allow animal spirits, electrical fluids, or types ofgas to suffuse or fill the
nerves, and thereby to propagate impressions from outside into the sensorium, or
whether I pursue the soul into the uttermost (and still more problematical) humours
of the brain (a project which at least has the merit of having done the uttermost) is,
with respect to the matter in hand, altogether indifferent. It is clear that our critique
has come full circle, but not that we have become in any degree wiser than we were to
begin with, about that antithesis from which we started. We leave behind man, as
evidently the most devious problem of all philosophy, and our critique ends here in
the same extremity with which it began.'09
Schelling's criticism ofthe attempts from Descartes to Soemmerring stressed that the
missing link between brain and mind could not be found within the categories of
causality. Instead he construed a unification of causation and teleology, by which
nature was regarded as "a circle which returns into itself, a self-enclosed system".' 10
Schelling applied his theory to brain research only in an aphoristic way and only in
106 On Schelling and Naturphilosophie see Guenter B. Risse, 'Kant, Schelling and the early search for a
philosophical "science" ofmedicine in Germany, J. Hist. Med., 1972, 27: 145-58; Dietrich von Engelhardt,
'Romantische Naturforschung', in Historisches Bewu,jtsein in der Naturwissenschaft von der Aufklarung bis
zum Positivismus, Freiburg and Munich, Alber, 1979, pp. 105-57. See also the various articles in Ludwig
Hasler (ed.), Schelling. Seine Bedeutungfur eine Philosophie der Natur und der Geschichte, Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1981; Hans Jorg Sandkuhler (ed.), Natur und geschichtlicher Prozeji:
Studien zurNaturphilosophie F. W. J. Schellings, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1984; Reinhard Heckmann et
al. (eds), Natur und Subjektivitdt: zur Auseinandersetzung mit der Naturphilosophie des jungen Schelling,
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1985. For a deeper understanding of philosophical
problems around 1800 it would be necessary to take into account Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), although I have to neglect both of them in this essay.
Important contributions in this context are Reinhard Lauth, Die transzendentale Naturlehre Fichtes nach
den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, Hamburg, Meiner, 1984; Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky
(eds), Hegel and the sciences, Dordrecht and Boston, Reidel, 1984.
107 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Ideasfor aphilosophy ofnature as introduction to the study ofthis
science, 1797. Second edition 1803, transl. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, Cambridge University Press,
1988, p. 42.
108 In this context I have to neglect various naturphilosophisch concepts of Johann Joseph Doemling
(1771-1803), Jakob Fidelis Ackermann (1765-1815), and Ignaz Doellinger (1770-1841).
109 Schelling, op. cit., note 107 above, p. 40.
'0 Ibid., p. 40.
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a few places. The rejection ofthe organ ofthe soul had an anti-dualist impetus, which
ended in Schelling's demand that physiologists restrict their research to the
investigation ofanimal functions. Concerning the relation ofsoul and body he noted:
"It is not their problem how these completely opposed viewpoints will finally be
united in one common entity".'1 1 What he meant was: carry on with your empirical
investigations ofthe brain, we-the philosophers-will manage the interpretation of
your results. This statement was certainly not a repetition or modification of Kant's
position, because for Kant itwas in no way the business ofphilosophy to interpret the
results of empirical research. On the contrary, we must interpret the
naturphilosophisch approach to brain theory as a challenge to Kant's epistemological
separation ofthe soul and the brain.112 When Schelling wrote this, he could not know
that only a few years later anatomists and physiologists would try to develop the
synthesis he had demanded.
In his autobiography, Karl Friedrich Burdach described his visit to Franz Joseph
Gall in Paris in 1826. Gall was extremely surprised:
He [Gall] asked me, whether I came from Konigsberg and whether I was the author of
the book about the brain [Vom Baue undLeben des Gehirns], and then he exclaimed:
"You are visiting me?". Admittedly I had said ofhim in this book, whilst recognizing
his other merits, that by trying to discover the basis of[psychological] phenomena he
had entered an area unfamiliar to him, where his crude materialism had created an
extremely daring theory."'3
Gall then went to his work table and fetched Burdach's book, saying that Burdach
had erroneously been convinced by Flourens' experiments (of 1824) and that he,
Gall, had refuted all of them. He added that Transzendentalphilosophie was
nonsense. According to this anecdote, Gall was convinced that Burdach's attack was
based on the results of Flourens' experiments and upon the theory of
Transzendentalphilosophie. Burdach did not reject this view in the cited passage, but
Gall was wrong in both assumptions.114 Burdach was no follower of Flourens, and
1ll Idem, Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der hoheren Physik Zur Erkiarung des allgemeinen Organismus,
1798, in Sdmmtliche Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 1. Abth., 10 vols, Stuttgart and Augsburg, Cotta,
1856-61, vol. 2, 1857, pp. 345-583, on p. 564.
112 On Schellings's opposition to Kant and its relevance for the development of Naturphilosophie see
Frederick Gregory, 'Kant's influence on natural scientists in the German Romantic period', in Nell trends
in the history ofscience: proceedings ofa conference held at the University ofUtrecht, R. P. W. Visser et al.
(eds), Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1989, pp. 53-66; idem, 'Kant, Schelling, and the administration ofscience in the
Romantic era', Osiris, 2nd ser., 1989, 6: 17-35.
113 Burdach, op. cit., note 16 above, p. 363. On Burdach's contribution to brain research see Kurt
Feremutsch, 'Organ der Seele: Beitrag zur Geschichte der romantischen Medizin nach den Werken Karl
Friedrich Burdachs (1776-1847)', Mschr. Psych. Neur., 1953, 125: 371-85; idem, 'Anthropologisch-
ontologische Aspekte in Karl Friedrich Burdachs Werk "Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns"', Scht%. med.
Wschr., 1978, 108: 418-22; Alfred Meyer, 'Karl Friedrich Burdach and his place in the history of
neuroanatomy', J. Neurol., Neurosurg. Psychiat., 1966, 3: 109-16.
114 There is someconfusion in this passage because ofthe useoftheword Transzendentalphilosophie. Gall
was probably convinced that Burdach rejected him on the ground of Schelling's Naturphilosophie.
Transzendentalphilosophie in the Kantian sense, on the other hand, is the system of all principles of pure
reason (see above). A third possibility might be Kant's notion of transzendentale Naturphilosophie. the
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perhaps Gall was not aware that Burdach had already rejected his organology as early
as 1810 in his bookDie Physiologie." I As noted, Gall knew Burdach's renowned Vom
Baue undLeben des Gehirns,"16 in which he described the anatomy and physiology of
the brain on the basis of his own experiments and dissections. His theory about the
presence of the soul in the brain was based mainly on the fundamentals of
Naturphilosophie, and this becomes clear after comparing the 1819-26 book with that
of 1810, which includes no empirical studies. Both versions agree in their
philosophical claims, but differ in their application to brain physiology.
In Die Physiologie Burdach described fully his version of naturphilosophisch
methodology. He distinguished between Naturkunde, which only described natural
phenomena, and Naturwissenschaft, which was the philosophical knowledge of
nature. Only in this way, he argued, is it possible to explain the phenomena ofnature,
its laws and causal connections. Physiology, then, was the doctrine of human life,
inasmuch as "the organic interlocking of the original appearances of a thing
constitutes life within it".117 According to Burdach, two different methods or sources
for physiology can be distinguished:
1. The empirical principle is the doctrine of organic functions. It consists of four
elements: observation, experimentation, the comparison between the healthy and the
diseased organism, and hypotheses. The most problematic element is
experimentation, because the results of the experimenters' manipulation are often
difficult to distinguish from unexpected and unintentional changes occurring in the
animal. Thus, experiments must be repeated under the same conditions. Moreover,
hypotheses should be based "on observation, experiments and analogy. They should
be simple and not applied too closely, they should make few assumptions, and should
explain a lot by the use oftheirpostulates. Furthermore they should not contradict an
accepted law ofnature".118 Thus far Burdach accepted theempirical principle, and he
characterized it as the only basis of physiology in former times, and as a necessary,
but insufficient basis for contemporary physiology.
2. The rational or scientific principle explains the connection between, the reason
for, and the purpose ofphenomena. Burdach assumed three ways ofexplaining these.
The first was to account for them on their own. Referring to the concept ofa life force
and to Blumenbach's Bildungstrieb, Burdach criticized the fact that neither explained
the function ofthe organism, butonly assumed an unknown force."19 The second way
was the use ofanalogy, which compares one group ofnatural phenomena with others,
either from organic or inorganic nature. Here Burdach enumerated nearly all the
theories around 1800 thought to explain the phenomena of life, and his criticism of
them all was that there was a particular phenomenon that was not considered or even
contradicted the theory. Ifsomemissing link could truly explain those phenomena, he
theory of the a priori conditions of science that is, of course, different from Schelling's concept. On this
difference see the articles by Gregory, op. cit., note 1 2 above.
115 Karl Friedrich Burdach, Die Physiologie, Leipzig, Weidmannische Buchhandlung, 1810.
116 Idem, Vom Baue und Leben des Gehirns, 3 vols, Leipzig, Dyk'sche Buchhandlung, 1819-26.
117 Idem, op. cit., note 115 above, p. 2.
118 Ibid., p. 7.
"I Ibid., p. 9.
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argued, then the cause oflife had to be sought in an absolute principle.120 His analysis
ofthe differentmodifications ofmaterialistic and vitalistic theories attempted to show
that these were useful, but could, after all, be applied only to physiological processes
and functions, but not to the nature of these processes and functions. Burdach
therefore proposed a third way, which explained life on the basis of the totality of
nature. This was a legitimate consequence ofSchelling's philosophy, because the laws
for nature and mind were identical. This law-or "higher sphere" in Burdach's
terminology-can be discerned in the following way: "The organization of all of
nature is revealed to us by merely using reason (reine Vernunftanschauung), which is
the true source ofNaturwissenschaft".121 Burdach did not isolate Vernunftanschauung
from the other two methods, but rather regarded it as the perfection of
Naturwissenschaft. According to Burdach, science was organized like the organism
itself, i.e., it was concerned with the idea ofadvancement. In this concept, observation
and experiment played a role equal to that ofthe explanation ofphenomena on their
own or by analogy, but he accepted these methods only in reference to
Vernunftanschauung, the noblest element in his model. With the construction ofthis
model Burdach met Schelling's provocative challenge perfectly. The remarkable
element in Burdach's approach is that he used it not only to explain the phenomena of
life, but also to elucidate the scientific method and its historical development.
The question now is, how did Burdach apply his theory to brain research?
However, his is less a synthesis of mind and matter than one of Soemmerring's and
Gall's doctrines on the basis of the tenets of Naturphilosophie. Burdach defined the
organ ofthe soul as the place where the psyche interacts with the brain.'22 The gas or
vapour in the cerebral ventricles, accordingly, could unify all parts of the brain, but
Burdach was in no way interested in animation and organization of the ventricular
fluid. With this close approximation to the dualistic view he seemed to challenge
Schelling's attempt to supersede dualism. Burdach's manoeuvre to avoidconflict with
Schelling was to create a polarity between the soul and the brain; in other words, the
soul and the brain were merely the antagonistic aspects of one absolute principle.
Burdach's view of Gall was more ambivalent. He agreed with some aspects of
organology, but attacked Gall for naivety in regarding human behaviour as
dependent upon the size of a brain organ. The point of discussion was again the
question ofinnate talents and propensities. Like Rudolphi, Burdach clearly pointed
out the importance ofeducation: "The development ofthe brain is most influenced by
education and by the use of free will'23 But, on the other hand, Burdach accepted
that organology demonstrated the main differences between man and animal. He
divided the brain and the skull into eight areas and regarded the visible bumps on the
skull as the representation of them. The lower areas represented the more primitive
propensities, while the upper represented reason.124 The highest area revealed the
combination oftemper (Gemut) and mind; here man was most distant from "physical
120 Ibid., p. 17. 21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 769.
123 Ibid., p. 774.
124 Ibid., p. 785.
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egoism" (korperlicher Egoismus) and felt "a part ofthe universe and hence embraces
the whole universe with love".'25 The idea ofthe absolute, ofeternity, was restricted
to man. Consequently, this is "visible in the bump on the top of the skull, and this
exists only in man".126
In this way Burdach, guided by Naturphilosophie, combined elements of
Soemmerring's and Gall's theories. Organology allowed him to prove the singularity
of man. Burdach's criticism of Gall was not intended as a rejection of brain
localization, but Gall had sinned against the naturphilosophisch tenet of combining
theempirical and the rational method. Burdach argued thatman's ability to recognize
the absolute harmony between himselfand the universe did not play the slightest role
in Gall's doctrine, and this had led him to materialism. For Burdach, however, that
harmony was an essential fact. It was a central aim ofNaturphilosophie to supersede
materialism and dualism, and Burdach fully agreed with this. In practice, however,
the interpretative range ofthis message was wide enough to combine heterogeneous
aspects. Thus Burdach was able to sustain Soemmerring's concept by stressing
exhaustively the concept ofpolarity. The question is not so much whether his attempt
was plausible or not, but rather why he made it. I propose that in 1810 Burdach had
no other choice. It is obvious that Gall's organology or Rudolphi's scepticism were
not reasonable alternatives for him; and equipotentiality ran counter to the hierarchy
ofthe brain, which was so important for Burdach as a manifestation ofthe difference
between man and animal. The concept of the organ of the soul was the final
alternative, and it seemed to be a compromise for Burdach, because Soemmerring's
model was not obviously dualistic.
The application of the principles of Naturphilosophie to brain research thus took
place on different levels, and this led to different results. The main and constant factor
was the identity between nature and soul and, as a consequence, the idea of an
absolute principle. All other factors were variable. This becomes clear when
Burdach's major revision of his theory in his three-volume treatise on the brain
(1819-26) is considered.
In 1813 Burdach had accepted a call from the University of Kbnigsberg to occupy
the chair ofanatomy and physiology. This gave him the opportunity to continue the
systematic anatomical studies of the brain that he had begun in Dorpat (Tartu) in
1811.
In the second volume of Vom Baue undLeben des Gehirns (1822) Burdach included
an extensive review of the entire history of brain research up to the early nineteenth
century.'27 He regarded Gall as highly innovative, but restricted his praise to the
anatomical studies: "But Gall stepped out of his sphere of expertise by trying to
discover the cause of the [mental] phenomena (Grund der Erscheinungen)".128
Burdach ignored not only the empirical aspects oforganology, but also Gall's use of
125 Ibid., p. 786.
126 Ibid., p. 787.
127 Burdach, op. cit., note 116 above, vol. 2, 1822, pp. 191-243. On Burdach's role as a historian of
neuroanatomy see Alfred Meyer, 'Karl Friedrich Burdach on Thomas Willis', J. neurol. Sci., 1966, 3:
109-16.
128 Burdach, op. cit., note 116 above, vol. 2, 1822, p. 229.
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anatomy to legitimize his doctrine. Rather, he blamed Gall for failing to offer
empirical proof for his theory, and pointed out that he had not found what he was
searching for,
namely a bridge between his theory and his anatomical findings; for he could not
prove that any of his so-called brain organs (with exception of the organ of the
reproductive instinct, which is supposed to be the cerebellum) stands in relation
exclusively with one specific part of the brain.'29
This might equally well have been written by Rudolphi. Burdach also noted the
incompatibility between structure and function despite Gall's and Soemmerring's
attempts to reconcile them. But while Rudolphi was led to a sceptical admission of
ignorance on this question, Burdach based his opinion on the basic tenet of
Naturphilosophie.
In contrast to his earlier approach, Burdach then began a harsh attack on the
dualistic view. He blamed Descartes for founding dualism and noted that this
mechanistic explanation for the interaction between soul and body was a product of
imagination, not empiricism.130 Soemmerring's anatomy was identified as the
"beginning of a new era" in brain research.'3' Burdach enumerated Soemmerring's
anatomical discoveries and casually mentioned his doctrine ofthe ventricular organ
ofthe soul without commenting on the fact that he had welcomed it only a few years
before.
On the grounds ofthisrejection, Burdach developed a newdefinition ofthe relation
between soul and brain. The soul was "a dynamic phenomenon (dynamische
Erscheinung), an inner activity of life (innere Lebenstdtigkeit), which had neither
material form nor external movement nor spatial activity (rdumliche
Wirksamkeit)".132 The brain, however, had all the properties the soul lacked. From
this Burdachconcluded that the entire brain is the organ ofthe soul, and proposed an
equilibrium between the two: the soul was the highest expression of the "dynamic
principle" in nature just as the brain was the highest expression of the "material
principle". Finally Burdach linked these principles to the dimensions of space and
time: "The brain contains the same characteristics in space as the soul does in time.
The brain is thus the physical image of the soul, the material condition of its
appearance within finitude".133 With this Burdach abandoned his earlier
assumptions: neither the differences between man and animal, nor the polarity
between soul and brain played a role any more. He replaced them with a pantheistic
world view, which he defined as an "apotheosis ofnature".134 Despite postulating a
divine orderwhich embraced the whole universe, Burdach did not ignore theproblem
ofthe unity ofthe soul. Unlike the body, he noted, thinking is indivisible, impossible
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., p. 208.
131 Ibid., p. 225.
132 Idem, op. cit., note 116 above, vol. 3, 1826, p. 159.
133 Ibid., p. 160.
134 Ibid., p. 153.
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to dissect. He was in agreement with the dualistic position in accepting the value of
self-consciousness and the freedom of the self. The fundamental difference between
this position and the Cartesian view ofCuvier and Flourens was that Burdach did not
use it to argue against the localization ofmental talents and propensities. A theory of
equipotential brain function would, he thought, mean ignoring the brain's high
degree of complexity, and furthermore would contradict the variety of the soul's
activities.135 Unlike Gall, however, Burdach combined the idea of the unity of the
soul with that of a distribution in space of the various mental capabilities:
Ifthe activity ofthe soul (Seelentatigkeit) is transmitted by the brain as a whole, then
each individual brain structure must make its own individual contribution to it or
participate in a significant way to the process as a whole.'36
With this statement Burdach reached a synthesis that combined the pantheistic
view ofthe absolute and the demand for the unity ofthe selfwith the localization of
brain function. Its remarkable feature is that Burdach incorporated elements of
dualism and ofGall's doctrine without involving their potential difficulties. This was
only possible with naturphilosophisch presuppositions. Burdach had attempted the
same course in his earlier proposition, but the result was quite different. The concepts
of polarity and of the different hierarchical spheres of the brain, in particular, no
longer played an important role. Of course, the superiority of ideas over physical
existence was the real origin oflife for Burdach,137 and human reason was the highest
expression ofnatural action.138 His primary aim was no longer to find arguments for
the superiority of the soul over matter and of man over animal. Instead he claimed
that Naturwissenschaft would be identical with natural theology, if natural
phenomena were regarded within the context of nature as a whole.'39
What isthe reason for the difference between Burdach's two propositions? Burdach
conducted anatomical research at Konigsberg, but it would be too simple to argue
that observation and dissection evoked a shift in the application ofNaturphilosophie
to brain theory. It would, for example, not have been necessary for him personally to
examine the brain to discover that not all cranial nerves originate in the ventricular
walls: this had already been noted by Rudolphi, Gall, and Meckel. Rather it was
Burdach's aim to revise some aspects of the relationship between Naturphilosophie
and brain research, and he borrowed some ideas from Carus, who had been his
student in Leipzig from 1807 to 1809. According to Carus himself, this relationship
was the basis for his interest in physiology.'40 His main study ofthe brain, published
131 Ibid., pp. 268-9.
136 Ibid., p. 269.
137 Idem, op. cit., note 116 above, vol. 1, 1819, p. 8.
131 Ibid., p. 4.
139Ibid., p. 15.
140 Cf. Carl Gustav Carus, Lebenserinnerungen undDenkwurdigkeiten. Erster Theil, Leipzig, Brockhaus,
1865, p. 24. See also the passage about Carus in Burdach's autobiography: op. cit., note 16 above, pp.
334-5.
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in 1814,141 was an important source for Burdach's later work,142 although Carus's
influence was embedded in a more general shift of Burdach's interests.
Basic to Carus's theory was the distinction between the somatic and the dynamic
aspect of the nervous system, both of which he reduced to one unifying principle.
Accordingly, the soul, although the highest and most noble manifestation of the
nervous system, was not basically different from other phenomena oflife.143 The next
step would be the examination of the brain in sequence from the lowest forms to its
highest expression, namely the human soul. Carus attacked his predecessors in brain
research for their faulty method; that is, they began with a search for the soul. This
approach, Carus argued, could only lead to the concept of the organ of the soul,
whose earlier acceptance had been directed by an "incorrect understanding of ideals
about the freedom ofthe soul, immortality, and so forth".144 Carus, far from denying
the moral value ofthese ideals, rejected the view that they would be contradicted by
the assumption of a more direct relationship between soul and brain. Because of the
assumed identity ofthe soul and the brain Carus saw no reason to put brain research
into the framework of moral questions, which would lead to the fatal mistake of
trying to find the organ of the soul. His alternative suggestion was based on the
well-known ideas of identity and of polarity. He thought that the conflict between
different powers was responsible for all physical phenomena. The polarity between
the life force (dynamic part) and the body (somatic part) leads to the expression of
life, although they were identical: "the body is the spatial form of the life force; life
force is the body, which appears in the form ofactivity".145 According to Carus, the
same was true for the relationship between brain and soul. The consequence oftheir
identity was that physical processes in the brain did not cause a change in the activity
ofthe soul, which was the manifestation ofidentity in time, while the processes in the
brain were its manifestation in space.'46 The central point in Carus's theory was that
this identity was expressed by the whole brain and the indivisible soul. This meant
that the action ofthe brain in its totality was correlated to the idea ofthe self, and the
product ofthis action was consciousness or the soul.147 At this point Carus pursued a
course different from Burdach's, because on the basis of his equation of the
141 Carl Gustav Carus, Versuch einer Darstellung des Nervensystems und insbesondere des Gehirns nach
ihrer Bedeutung, Entwicklung und Vollendung im thierischen Organismus, Leipzig, Breitkopf & Hartel,
1814. Carus's neuroanatomy is analysed by Kurt Feremutsch, 'Die Grundzuge der Hirnanatomie bei
Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869): ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Medizin und Naturwissenschaften
des beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts', Centaurus, 1951-53, 2: 52-85.
142 Burdach wrote enthusiastically about Carus's work, although he admitted that he had problems with
some ofhisideas (see note 138 below). Cf. Burdach, op. cit., note 116above, vol. 2, 1822, pp. 235-6. On the
relation of Burdach's and Carus's brain theories see Stefano Poggi, 'Mind and brain in medical thought
during the Romantic period', Hist. Phil. Life Sci., 1988, 10: suppl., 41-53. One of Poggi's main points is
Burdach's influence on Carus's work Psyche, published in 1846; but he does not consider Burdach's Die
Physiologie and Carus's study ofthe brain from 1814 and thus does not explore Carus's early influence on
Burdach. Furthermore it can be argued that there exist fundamental differences between the theory ofthe
early and the late Carus.
1 3Carus, op. cit., note 141 above, p. iv.
l44 Ibid., p. 5.
145 Ibid., p. 14.
146 Ibid., p. 20.
141 Ibid., p. 20.
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indivisibility of the soul and the totality of brain function he strongly rejected any
localization of the soul or of its functions.148
Carus's refutation of Gall is thus fundamentally different from Burdach's. While
the latter had accused Gall of materialism, Carus stressed that Gall's research had
started with the organ ofthe soul, and that he had continued by seeking more inferior
organs "in order to ignore no lobe orfibre ofthe brain which could not be regarded as
the specific organ ofa particular power ofthe soul".149 It seems peculiar that Carus
should place Gall in thedualistic tradition in the search for the organ ofthe soul, with
the difference that Gall had proposed not only one, but many organs. But Carus
suspected that every theory primarily focusing on the human brain was directed by an
erroneous metaphysical supposition, whereas he aimed to investigate the brain in its
phylogenetic development.'50 This plan, however, did not include the examination of
human talents and propensities. Hence the final question in Carus's book is that of
"the innate psychical propensities and talents and their manifestation in the structure
(Bildung) of the brain";'51 and he agreed with Rudolphi and Burdach that the
differences between men were based on human freedom and the circumstances oflife,
and on education rather than on the size of the brain.
Burdach and Carus were in full agreement in regarding the soul as the temporal,
and the brain as the spatial aspect of a unified principle. The reference to the
dimensions of space and time had an epistemological background. In spite of its
criticism ofdualism and materialism, this naturphilosophisch brain theory represents
an attempt to supersede Kant's epistemological separation ofthe soul and the brain.
This does not mean that Burdach or Carus returned to the position against which
Kant'scriticism had been aimed. They accepted thedimensions oftime and space, but
they unified them on a higher level. Burdach, in particular, called attention to the
insufficiency of the hypothesis that the soul was subject only to the inner senses.
Ourconsciousness tells us that oursoul isindividually confirmed to one specific body,
that is, to specific spatial boundaries. We feel that this body belongs to our being and
recognize that our soul is bound to it. The soul becomes manifest and operates by
means of these very same spatial barriers.'52
Thus individuality and personality are necessarily correlated with the body, and the
knowledge of its unity with the soul is the result of self-experience. Burdach was
sympathetic to the investigation ofthe brain on the basis ofthe human self, and as a
result he was able to establish two levels ofknowledge. The metaphysical experience
ofthe unity ofthe selffound its complement in physiological localization, which did
not undermine the unity because it did not propose a causal connection between mind
148 Ibid., p. 50. At the same time Carus did not hesitate to localize the visual and auditory systems in the
brain.
149Ibid., p. 301.
150 It is not surprising that Burdach's main criticism ofCarus was directed at this point: he thought that
Carus should have considered the human brain more seriously. See Burdach, op. cit., note 116 above, vol.
2, 1822, pp. 235-6.
51 Carus, op. cit., note 141 above, p. 310.
152 Burdach, op. cit., note 116 above, vol. 3, 1826, p. 153.
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and matter, and because it avoided assuming organs of pride, vanity, and so forth.
The consequence of physiological localization, however, was Burdach's more
practical orientation: in his book he presented an enormous collection of studies of
patients with brain lesions, something virtually neglected by Carus. As I have argued,
it is not plausible to explain the change in Burdach's approach between 1810 and
1819-26 by his experience in dissection, but it is also insufficient to explain this
practical turn as solely the result of Carus's influence. Burdach was certainly not
willing to give up his naturphilosophisch approach, but he had also been professor at a
Prussian university since 1814. The impact of Naturphilosophie on anatomy and
physiology had never been very strong in Prussia; indeed, around 1820 all Prussian
anatomy professors were outspoken and vigorous critics of Naturphilosophie as
vague and without any empirical value. Rudolphi and Meckel, the most famous, had
a strong influence with the government of Karl Freiherr vom Stein zum Altenstein
(1770-1840).153 If Burdach did not want to lose his reputation and influence-and
this included, for example, more financial support for the Anatomical Institute in
K6nigsberg-154 then he had to ensure that his research had some empirical and
practical value. In his autobiography, Burdach recounted how he sent to Altenstein
an essay on morphology one day. The minister responded reproachfully that some
passages might seduce the medical students to "hypotheses" and "vague
raisonnement".155 Burdach suspected that it was in fact Rudolphi who was
responsible for the criticism. I do not suggest that Burdach felt compelled to convert
to "empiricism", but it is reasonable to assume that the combination of a
naturphilosophisch approach with a practical orientation in physiology developed
along with his position as a Prussian professor.'56 This might also plausibly explain
the shift in the application ofNaturphilosophie to brain research in Burdach's second
approach, in which the unity of the self was embedded in a pantheistic view of an
identity between the soul and the brain. This view, however, harmonized much better
with practical demands than the former assumptions of polarity in order to sustain
the organ ofthe soul and the hierarchical spheres ofthe brain. Burdach's message was
clear: the concept of the organ of the soul had definitely met its demise, and Gall's
doctrine was divided in a useful, empirical component and in a useless, materialistic
one.
THE END OF THE ORGAN OF THE SOUL"
My aim has been to demonstrate the complexity of the discussions on brain
research in early nineteenth-century Germany. The theoretical backgrounds for the
various concepts went far beyond anatomical and physiological problems. The
question ofthe presence ofthe soul in the brain had been a subject ofanatomy from
153 The other anatomists were AdolfWilhelm Otto (1786-1845) in Breslau; August Franz Joseph Karl
Mayer (1787-1865) in Bonn; and Friedrich Christian Rosenthal (1779-1829) in Greifswald.
I- Cf.WolfgangBargmann, 'ZurGeschichtederAnatomie inKonigsberg(Pr.)bis zumJahre 1860', Anat.
Anz., 1943, 94: 161-208.
155 Burdach, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 299-300.
156 In this context it would be interesting to examine Burdach's Die Physiologie als Erfahrungswissen-
schaft, 6 vols, Leipzig, L. Voss, 1826-40, in which he collaborated with younger scientists like Karl Ernst
von Baer (1792-1876), Johannes Muller (1801-1858), Heinrich Rathke (1793-1860), and others.
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antiquity to Descartes and to Soemmerring. The latter made a final attempt to
preserve the concept ofthe organ ofthe soul by combining the methods ofanatomy
with certain theoretical assumptions of late eighteenth-century "vital materialism".
Despite his failure, the significance of the problem was appreciated. None of the
authors discussed above would have denied that the relationship of the soul to the
brain was a most important issue. But in the transition from the Enlightenment to the
Romantic period, the epistemological view, which was stressed by Kant and picked
up and transformed by Schelling and his successors, was only one component. The
relation between the size, structure, and function ofthe human brain and behaviour
was linked to the definition ofthe differences between men and animals, and ofmen
among themselves. It is generally accepted that the question of whether there were
innate differences between individuals or whether they were equal was a central topic
ofthe Enlightenment; brain anatomy was not divorced from this issue. Ofcourse, no
one denied that the formula "big is beautiful"'57 was an appropriate principle by
which to distinguish between animal and man. Anatomists and anthropologists tried
hard to find an effective parameter for correlating brain and species within the Chain
ofBeing. This general agreement, however, must not be transferred to the problem of
characterizing men.'58 Here we can discern the element common to scientists like
Soemmerring and Gall. For both the formula "big is beautiful" was connected with
the explanation of human nature. Although Gall was much more radical than
Soemmerring, anatomy was absolutely necessary to both. This materialistic view was
rejected with several arguments. Rudolphi stressed the methodological standpoint
and argued that anatomy was not suitable to support that view. At the same time, he
was in full agreement with Burdach and Carus that human behaviour was primarily a
result of education and of the circumstances of life. This coalition suggests that the
distinction between Naturphilosophie and empiricism is not necessarily useful. If
Gall's pessimism denied the progressive perfection ofmankind, then the Enlightened
ideal of the equality of man united scientists who had quite opposite theories.159
Focusing on the problem ofthe unity and indivisibility ofthe soul, we see another
puzzling interrelation of the different opinions. The independence of the soul was a
central assumption in French dualism (Cuvier, Flourens) and in German
Naturphilosophie (Burdach, Carus). The difference seems to be that Kant's
epistemological definitions stimulated further discussions in Germany, but not in
France. Kant's definition forced the Naturphilosophen to consider and to accept the
logical premises for distinguishing between space and time. Strictly anti-dualistic and
anti-materialistic thinkers, they proposed that the brain and the soul were only two
aspects ofone and the same thing, namely the absolute principle. This tenet not only
led to different applications in Burdach's and Carus's approaches, but also within
Burdach's own work. This suggests that Naturphilosophie was a spiritus rector
157 I have borrowed the term from Bynum, 'Varieties', op. cit., note 9 above, p. 29.
158 The relation ofhuman nature and anthropology is the subject ofMann and Dumont, op. cit., note 12
above. See also Pogliano, op. cit., note 3 above.
159 On Gall's fatalism see Temkin, op. cit., note 5 above, pp. 300-7.
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without absolute authority, and with a field wide enough to allow for various
attempts at new orientations.160
Finally, the discussion around 1800 cannot be subsumed as the choice between
localization theory and brain equipotentiality. For Burdach, the first was not the
alternative to the second. Instead he combined both on the basis ofNaturphilosophie
and proposed two different points of view regarding the same thing. His basic aim
was to avoid materialism. Meckel, on the other hand, came to a similar pragmatic
conclusion by reducing the problem to anatomical and clinical observation.
Nevertheless, it is true that Burdach and Meckel favoured cerebral localization,
whereas Rudolphi and Carus did not. But all the physiologists examined here were
influenced by Gall, and each used a completely different strategy in order to reach
their conclusions. Rudolphi rejected cerebral localization on the grounds of
scepticism of the validity of anatomical observations and of his psychological
premises; Carus on naturphilosophisch grounds. Again, we could place Rudolphi and
Carus in the category of anti-localizationists, although they had radically different
positions.
Soemmerring's and Gall's concepts were discussed within various dimensions and
finally rejected by a variety ofarguments. This "plurality" was at least an expression
of the scientific, philosophical, and political situation in early nineteenth century
Germany. It demonstrates the enormousness ofthe theoretical enterprise required to
create a methodology for explaining the phenomena of life. The soul and the brain
were the most sensitive entities in this field, because understanding them not only
meant understanding the world but also the self, including human thoughts and
feelings.
160 I completely agree with Brigitte Lohff, who argues that in general naturphilosophisch physiology
should be seen as a search for a new basic methodology in science, and as such was a necessary precursor of
biophysical physiology: Die Suche nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Physiologie in der Fit der Zomantik.
ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnisphilosophie der Medizin, Stuttgart and New York, Gustav Fischer, 1990.
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